Killing Innovation?: Antitrust Implications of Killer Acquisitions by Madl, Amy C.
Yale Law School 
Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository 
Yale Journal on Regulation Online Bulletin 
2020 
Killing Innovation?: Antitrust Implications of Killer Acquisitions 
Amy C. Madl 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/jregonline 
 
28 
Killing Innovation?: Antitrust Implications of 
Killer Acquisitions 
Amy C. Madl† 
Killer instinct is a key business asset. Firms live and die by their stra-
tegic choices, and the desire to outcompete rivals colors most business 
decisions. While many firms strive to win market share on their merits, 
economists have recently identified an anti-competitive practice—killer 
acquisition—that enables incumbents to maintain market share by bury-
ing, rather than beating, rival technologies. In these acquisitions, firms 
buy competitors to prevent market cannibalization, preserving profits at a 
price that is right for both the acquirer and the target. 
This Article examines suspected killer acquisitions in the pharma-
ceutical industry, where the practice has been empirically studied, and 
envisions ways in which antitrust law can address them. Drawing on re-
cent evidence suggesting that few factors are either necessary or sufficient 
to identify a killer acquisition, this Article argues that neutral to pro-
competitive motivations predominate for enough overlapping acquisi-
tions that heightened review is unlikely to prevent killer acquisitions from 
occurring, while raising costs for all legitimate transactions. This Article 
also expands on the ongoing debate around killer acquisitions by consid-
ering the probable prevalence of killer acquisitions outside the pharma-
ceutical industry and notes structural factors that promote these acquisi-
tions. Through comparison with another anti-competitive crutch the 
pharmaceutical industry has been known to lean on—reverse settlements 
with generic manufacturers—this Article further proposes rule of reason 
review as the appropriate standard for overlapping acquisitions. While 
anti-competitive mischief may sneak through under this standard, current 
evidence does not suggest that firms are getting away with murder, at 
least where consumer welfare is concerned. 
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Introduction 
Competition kills, burying rivals and rivalrous goods. The bulk of an-
titrust law focuses on one dimension of competition—price—and the disci-
pline of rivals with respect to price.1 However, firms also compete by out-
innovating their competitors, shifting the demand curve to increase pro-
ducer surplus and total welfare.2 Consumers benefit too: innovation 
drives economic growth, improves human health, and enriches daily life.3 
However, the long-term dynamic efficiencies wrought by innovation can 
pose short-term problems for competitors, who at least temporarily lose 
market share.4  
Competitive anxiety about innovation often plays out in the context 
of design changes and “predatory” innovation.5 In some cases, a monopo-
                                                             
1 See Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 716 (2017) 
(“[A]ntitrust doctrine views low consumer prices, alone, to be evidence of sound competition.”). 
2 See Thomas N. Dahdouh & James F. Mongoven, The Shape of Things to Come: Innovation 
Market Analysis in Merger Cases, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 405, 409 (1996). 
3 See id. at 408-10. 
4 See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Design of Production, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 
1155, 1160, 1174-75 (2018). 
5 See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Bryson, J. con-
curring) (finding enough evidence that Bard modified its biopsy gun to prevent the use of com-
peting replacement needles to support the jury’s finding of an antitrust violation). See generally 
Stacey Dogan, The Role of Design Choice in Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law, 15 COLO. 
TECH. L.J. 101 (2016) (discussing the economic principles at issue in predatory innovation cases, 
where courts on rare occasion find antitrust liability based on unilateral design choices). 
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list re-designs its products to leverage market power in one market to 
gain a competitive advantage in another, either through bundling6 or in-
tentional incompatibility with third-party complements.7 In others, a mo-
nopolist extends its intellectual property rights over a core product to be-
come the dominant player in the service after-market as new innovations 
reduce demand for its core product.8 For example, a monopolist can in-
troduce and restrict access to a valuable new diagnostic tool9 or make it 
prohibitively expensive for after-market competitors to obtain necessary 
inputs,10 using its past and present innovations to create or maintain mar-
ket power. In highly scrutinized sectors like the pharmaceutical industry, 
a monopolist may even rely on the intersection of regulatory law and in-
tellectual property law to block competition through incremental innova-
tion.11 Illustratively, pharmaceutical companies sometimes pull existing 
products from the market and introduce new, patent-protected reformu-
lations shortly before other patents covering the drug expire,12 a so-called 
“hard switch.” Hard switches—which force existing patients onto the new 
drug before generic entry—can make it difficult or impossible for patients 
to obtain cheaper generic drugs via state automatic drug-substitution 
laws.13 
Killer acquisitions, an anti-competitive business strategy recently de-
scribed by economists Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer, and Song 
                                                             
6 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that Mi-
crosoft’s merger of Windows and Internet Explorer constituted an illegal bundling arrange-
ment). 
7 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting a 
competitor’s position that a firm with market power had a duty to pre-disclose new comple-
ments). 
8 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (finding an antitrust 
violation could arise from exclusionary conduct in the after-market for repair parts even when 
the manufacturer lacked significant market power in the primary equipment market). 
9 See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding 
that refusal to license copyrighted diagnostic software to competing technicians was insufficient 
evidence to support a monopolization claim). 
10 See Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 482-86 (finding that Kodak’s refusal to sell spare parts for 
its copiers to third-party service organizations, which forced consumers to obtain maintenance 
services directly from Kodak, could constitute unlawful monopoly maintenance). See generally 
Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 
483 (1995) (discussing the rare possibility of consumer injury in monopolized aftermarkets). 
11 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 171-78 (2016) (explaining product hopping in the pharmaceutical 
industry, a form of life-cycle management in which a drug company reformulates its older prod-
uct and encourages doctors to preferentially prescribe the reformulated product).  
12 See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 2015) (describ-
ing Actavis’s attempted withdrawal of its immediate release formulation of Namenda, a drug 
intended to treat moderate-to-severe Alzheimer’s disease, to force a switch to its new once-daily 
extended release formulation). 
13 See id. at 649. 
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Ma14 that has inspired intense debate in the antitrust community,15 “com-
plement” these traditional tactics. Instead of leveraging their intellectual 
property rights to weaken competitors, as firms do in predatory (and non-
predatory) innovation cases, firms engaging in killer acquisitions buy 
competing technologies—and bury them. Killer acquisitions are distinct 
from traditional acquisitions, in which an innovative new entrant is ac-
quired by an incumbent who then exploits the acquired technology in its 
own product lines.16 While traditional acquisitions also eliminate real or 
potential competitors, they generally maintain competing innovations. 
Antitrust law to date has focused on the static market structure changes 
associated with these acquisitions, only condemning acquisitions that re-
sult in a substantial increase in market concentration.17 However, the pro-
competitive synergies expected from traditional acquisitions, such as fur-
ther specialization and subsequent innovation, are largely absent when 
firms simultaneously seek to kill competitors and competing technologies. 
Therefore, as others have suggested,18 antitrust authorities should con-
demn killer acquisitions—if they can identify them. 
But identifying a killer acquisition ex ante or ex post is not a trivial 
pursuit. Firms routinely choose to discontinue product lines and devel-
opment projects; therefore, determining the primary business rationale 
when a firm acquires and subsequently abandons a technology is an er-
ror-prone endeavor. Nevertheless, “pure” killer acquisitions, in which a 
firm never intended to develop an acquired technology, can be a rational 
business decision.19 Specifically, when there is any degree of acquirer-
target product overlap, acquirers have stronger incentives to discontinue 
development than target firms because some of their existing profits will 
                                                             
14 See Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer & Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions (unpublished manu-
script), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3241707 (defining killer acquisitions). 
15 See, e.g., James Baker, Rebalancing the Scales, FRONTIER ECON., http://www.frontier-
economics.com/uk/en/news-and-articles/articles/article-i6723-rebalancing-the-scales/ (2020); Se-
bastian Jungermann, "Killer Acquisitions" in Antitrust Authorities' Sights: Risk for Innovative 
Startups?, ARNOLD & PORTER (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/ 
publications/2019/09/killer-acquisitions-antitrust-authorities-sights (Sept. 4, 2019); Jacquelyn 
MacLennan et al., Innocent Until Proven Guilty – Five Things You Need to Know About Killer 
Acquisitions, INFORMA CONNECT: COMPETITION L. (May 3, 2019), 
https://informaconnect.com/innocent-until-proven-guilty-five-things-you-need-to-know-about-
killer-acquisi-tions (May 3, 2019). 
16 Illustratively, Facebook maintained and grew Instagram after acquiring the competing social 
media network. See Yoni Heisler, Once Mocked, Facebook’s $1 Billion Acquisition of Insta-
gram Was a Stroke of Genius, BGR (Dec. 29, 2016, 11:26PM), 
https://bgr.com/2016/12/29/facebook-instagram-acquisition-1-billion-genius/. Similarly, Amazon 
integrated Diapers.com into its platform after ending its price war through acquisition. See 
Khan, supra note 1, at 768-74.  
17 See DOJ-F.T.C Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 5.7. 
18 See MacLennan et al., supra note 15. 
19 See Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 1-2. 
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be cannibalized by the substitute product.20 Accordingly, the profit-
protection benefits accruing to a monopolist from acquiring property 
rights to prevent entry will sometimes substantially exceed the benefits to 
the monopolist of introducing the new innovation, as well as the value of 
the new innovation to the prospective new entrant.21  
However, the rational conditions for acquiring to kill depend on the 
probability of project success, the expected profits for the acquirer with 
and without acquisition, the development gains for both the new entrant 
and the acquirer, the new project’s development costs, and the project’s 
liquidation value.22 Firms considering acquisitions may only know some 
of these values, or make decisions based on uncertain or incorrect valua-
tions. For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, determining the 
probability of project success, even in late-stage clinical trials, is at best an 
imperfect science.23 Moreover, information asymmetries and psychologi-
cal errors may cause the new entrant and incumbent to estimate critical 
parameters differently, distorting the circumstances in which a killer ac-
quisition appears rational to both parties. Therefore, attempts by courts 
and antitrust agencies to determine if specific acquirers could rationally 
acquire new technologies just to kill them may not shed much light on the 
party-perceived economics of the transaction, let alone their true motiva-
tions.  
This Article argues that difficulties identifying killer acquisitions 
caution against increased scrutiny of overlapping acquisitions. Part I 
briefly discusses an influential recent working paper on potential killer 
acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry. Part II considers incumbent 
motivations for pharmaceutical acquisitions, focusing on cases of overlap 
in innovation markets where neither the acquirer nor the target markets a 
product. Without condoning killer acquisitions, Part III argues that neu-
tral or pro-competitive motivations predominate for enough overlapping 
acquisitions that heightened review is unlikely to increase social welfare. 
Additionally, because courts lack experience with killer acquisitions, as 
well as obvious means of identifying them, Part III advocates for rule of 
                                                             
20 See id. at 2. 
21 Because new entrants often rely on outside funding and do not have established infrastructure, 
research and development (R&D) and start-up costs may be higher for new entrants than in-
cumbents, reducing the expected payoff for a new technology. See Joseph H. Golec & John A. 
Vernon, Financial Risk in the Biotechnology Industry 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 13604, 2007) (“The presence of capital market imperfections for R&D finance 
imparts a cost advantage to internally-generated funds over external debt and equity; thus, even 
holding constant financial risk and the required rate of return on new equity issues, biotech firms 
with no cash flows are at a financing disadvantage.”). 
22 See Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 9-21. 
23 See Andrew Joseph, How Well Can You Predict the Outcome of Clinical Trials? Not as Well 




reason review of overlapping acquisitions. Finally, Part IV considers the 
probable prevalence of killer acquisitions outside the pharmaceutical in-
dustry and notes structural factors that promote these acquisitions.  
I. Killer Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
To explore occurrences of killer acquisitions in the pharmaceutical 
industry, economists Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer, and Song Ma 
assembled a comprehensive database of more than 16,000 pharmaceutical 
drug projects.24 Using this data set, Cunningham and co-authors identified 
overlapping acquisitions in which the acquirer purchased a development 
candidate (overlapping drug) in the same therapeutic market with the 
same mechanism of action as an FDA-approved drug already owned by 
the acquirer.25 The authors then tracked development events (e.g., ad-
vancing to later stage clinical trials) and determined that overlapping 
drugs were 3.7% less likely to have a development event post-acquisition 
than drugs acquired by companies without a similar drug in their product 
portfolio and 5.7% less likely to have a development event post-
acquisition than non-acquired projects.26 Additionally, the authors identi-
fied competition, defined as the number of drugs marketed or under de-
velopment in the same therapeutic market and acting through the same 
mechanism of action, as an important predictor of development prospects 
for an overlapping project.27 In a high competition environment, the 
change in development rate was insignificant and economically negligible, 
while the absolute probability of a subsequent development event 
dropped by 6.5% in low competition environments.28 Furthermore, the 
authors discovered that post-acquisition terminations were concentrated 
among overlapping projects acquired by firms with patents with more 
than five years of term remaining, consistent with the profit shielding ex-
pected when an incumbent can maintain its market power for many years 
to come.29 However, the absolute odds of a development event were low 
for all developmental candidates, and no single transaction feature was 
both necessary and sufficient to identify a killer acquisition.30 
                                                             
24 See Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 3. 
25 See id.  
26 See id. at 30.  
27 See id. at 35-36. 
28 See id.  
29 See id. at 36-37.  
30 See id. at 40, 47, 66 tbl.2, 68 tbl.4. 
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II. Rationales for Killing an Overlapping Drug Post-Acquisition 
Despite cannibalization concerns, colorable pro-competitive (or at 
least neutral) justifications exist for acquiring a drug that overlaps with a 
firm’s existent FDA-approved product, even if the drug is far from patent 
expiry and faces limited competition. Illustratively, the mechanisms of ac-
tion used in the Cunningham, Ederer, and Ma study to identify cases of 
overlap are not mutation-specific, meaning that two drugs targeting the 
same enzyme and having the same net effect (e.g., inhibition) may not 
treat the same patients. Accordingly, purchasing the second drug could 
expand the acquirer’s market, rather than cannibalize sales. For example, 
Vertex Pharmaceuticals markets two combination therapies (Orkambi™ 
and Symdeko™) for treating cystic fibrosis containing the same CFTR 
potentiator but different CFTR correctors.31 The two therapies are ap-
proved for some overlapping patient populations but also have distinct 
age group and indication approvals within the broad umbrella of cystic 
fibrosis.32 Personalized medicine is still in its infancy, and definitively rul-
ing out differential population effects following Phase I safety trials, when 
many drugs are acquired,33 would be a fool’s errand based on current sci-
entific knowledge and typical trial power. 
Market expansion, not cannibalization, may also occur when the 
FDA-approved drug has side effects that preclude its use in certain pa-
tient groups.34 In these cases, the drugs, while overlapping in terms of in-
dication and broadly defined mechanism of action, occupy partially inde-
pendent markets. Additionally, an incumbent might pursue an 
overlapping drug for combination therapies or non-overlapping indica-
tions if the “substitute” is easier to formulate, results in fewer side effects, 
or appears to be eligible for longer patent and regulatory exclusivity than 
the drug it nominally replaces.35  
                                                             
31 See Research and Pipeline, Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc. (2020), 
https://www.vrtx.com/research-development/pipeline/ (describing therapies within Vertex’s cyst-
ic fibrosis program); see also CFTR Modulator Therapies, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND., 
https://www.cff.org/Life-With-CF/Treatments-and-Therapies/Medications/CFTR-Modulator-
Therapies/ (explaining the mechanism of action for the components of Orkambi™ and 
Symdeko™). 
32 See FDA Approves New CFTR Modulator Treatment for Cystic Fibrosis, CYSTIC FIBROSIS 
FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.cff.org/News/News-Archive/2018/FDA-Approves-New-
CFTR-Modulator-Treatment-for-Cystic-Fibrosis/. 
33 See Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 37-38, 71 tbl.7. 
34 Cf. Mandy Oaklander, New Hope for Depression, TIME (July 27, 2017), https://time.com/ 
magazine/us/4876068/august-7th-2017-vol-190-no-6-u-s/ (discussing the potential market for new 
antidepression medications with reduced adverse side effects relative to available treatments). 
35 Cf. Monique Carter & Saima Khan, Novel-Novel Fixed-Dose Combination Therapies, 18 
NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 413, 413 (2019) (highlighting potential benefits of fixed-
dose combinations comprising investigational drugs in the treatment of multifactorial diseases). 
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In fact, around 92 to 95% of overlapping pharmaceutical acquisitions 
do not appear to be motivated purely by a desire to kill competing inno-
vations,36 a fraction that might be even higher when overlap exists solely 
within innovation markets. To highlight the potential pitfalls of too 
broadly construing the scope of potential killer acquisitions for antitrust 
purposes, the subparts below consider four possible reasons why a firm 
may acquire and subsequently terminate an overlapping development 
project beyond mistake: (1) optimal intra-project selection; (2) class-
based drug problems; (3) killing competition; and (4) resource redeploy-
ment.   
A. Optimal Intra-Project Selection 
First, in cases of innovation market overlap, a firm may acquire an 
overlapping drug as a backup or alternative to their internal development 
candidate. Backup acquisition may be especially likely if the internal drug 
shows therapeutic promise in early-stage (Phase I) clinical trials but is dif-
ficult to manufacture or associated with side effects rooted in the drug’s 
chemical structure. Under those circumstances, the firm might evaluate 
the relative prospects of its internal drug and the acquired drug, only ad-
vancing the more promising drug.37 If the internal drug was deemed more 
promising and ultimately obtained approval, the acquirer would likely 
elect to abandon the acquired backup, at least for the indication it was in-
itially developed for. While this outcome hurts competition if the backup 
also would have obtained FDA approval in a but-for world, it may be 
neutral to socially beneficial if the drug was insufficiently safe or effective 
to obtain approval.  
Optimal intra-project selection is partially a “market for lemons” 
story. If the acquirer had perfect information regarding the acquired 
drug, it would presumably be able to predict ex ante whether its internal 
drug or the acquired drug was the better clinical candidate. In that case, 
the acquirer would only acquire an overlapping drug if it believed the 
overlapping drug better than its own. Cunningham and co-authors’ ob-
servation that a firm with a FDA-approved drug is 23.4% less likely to 
continue developing an overlapping project may be consistent with firms 
being only slightly better than chance at forecasting whether an external 
                                                             
36 See Cunningham et al., supra note 15, at 47. Cunningham, Ederer, and Ma considered four 
alternative interpretations for “killer” acquisitions when a firm already markets an overlapping 
FDA-approved drug: asymmetric information; optimal project selection in a multi-project acqui-
sition; human capital redeployment; salvage acquisitions; and technology redeployment. See id. 
at 42-46. 
37 Whether the acquirer could determine the more promising drug at the due diligence stage, 
prior to acquisition, is unclear. As Cunningham and co-authors note, an acquiring firm will typi-
cally possess less information about the quality of an acquired drug than the target firm. See id. 
at 42.  
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drug represents a marketable advance.38 Given that acquired single-
project targets, where the acquirer likely engaged in due diligence for the 
overlapping drug, are only 12.1% less likely to have a development 
event,39 acquirers may be accurately assessing relative merits—when they 
consider them. However, acquirers of single-project targets bid against 
non-overlapping firms that are independently valuing the same technolo-
gy, in contrast to multi-project targets where valuations depend on the 
pipeline projects each bidder feels best positioned to exploit. Therefore, 
firms may be equally capable of evaluating technologies in multi-project 
and single-project transactions, with single-project killer acquisitions 
merely being costlier to execute and thus less likely to occur.  
B. Class-Based Drug Problems 
Second, an acquirer may decide to terminate development of both 
the overlapping drug and its substitute due to class-based drug prob-
lems.40 When a firm takes ownership of an overlapping project, it gains 
access to additional data about the therapeutic efficacy and potential side 
effects of a drug similar to its own. Combining insights gained from its 
own clinical trials with another firm’s proprietary data, the acquirer may 
conclude that both drugs exhibit adverse side effects related to their 
mechanism of action. Alternatively, given a broader combined pool of 
patient data, the acquirer may re-analyze clinical trial results with higher 
statistical power and determine that the observed therapeutic efficacy 
was a false positive.41 The firm might then abandon development of both 
projects, reducing clinical trial expenditures and potentially increasing 
consumer welfare by moving patients to safer or more effective therapies.  
C. Killing Competition 
Third and worst, an acquirer with an early-stage overlapping project 
may be attempting to bury the competition without competing on the 
merits. Even though neither drug has market share yet, clinical candi-
                                                             
38 See id. at 3.  
39 See id. at 68 tbl.4.  
40 See Lessons to Learn from the COX-2 Saga, HARV. HEALTH PUB. (Mar. 2014), 
https://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/lessons-to-learn-from-the-cox-2-saga (consid-
ering the adverse side effects associated with Vioxx, a COX-2 inhibitor that doubled patients’ 
risk of heart attack and stroke, which were shared by some other class members and resulted in 
the voluntary recall of two drugs). 
41 Cf. Li et al., Discontinued Drugs for the Treatment of Cardiovascular Disease from 2016 to 
2018, 20 INT. J. MOLECULAR SCI. art. 4513, tbl.1 (2019) (listing two signal transduction modula-
tors for treating cardiovascular disease that were discontinued in Phase II or III for efficacy rea-




dates compete for clinical trial participants and trial sites,42 which may af-
fect profits by delaying FDA approval. However, a successful acquired 
overlapping project does not inherently create a two-product oligopoly 
for the acquirer. Instead, development choices, as well as the inherent ef-
ficacy of the drug candidates, may lead to zero, one, or two marketed 
drugs.43 Accordingly, the acquirer’s killer intent should be reduced rela-
tive to a firm with an FDA-approved product. The supracompetitive 
profits killer acquisitions protect are only speculative at the acquisition 
stage and may never materialize—or only materialize due to the acquisi-
tion of a better drug. But given the uncertainty surrounding clinical de-
velopment, acquiring to kill could appear rational, particularly if firms 
overestimate their odds of obtaining approval. 
D. Asset Redeployment 
Fourth, human capital and technology redeployment could explain 
some overlapping acquisitions. To assess this alternative when the ac-
quirer already markets an overlapping drug, Cunningham and co-authors 
considered the chemical similarity of acquired drugs to pre- and post-
acquisition products of the acquirer to probe technology redeployment, 
finding that drugs developed by acquirers in the five years post-drug ac-
quisition were not more similar to the acquired drug than those devel-
oped in the preceding five years.44 However, unless the chemical structure 
of the acquired drug was previously unknown, or the method of synthe-
sizing the drug’s core structure was unduly burdensome without the tar-
get’s trade secrets, it is not clear why technology redeployment would re-
sult in more structural similarity post-acquisition, at least in the context of 
small molecule drugs, as the acquirer would already possess the necessary 
knowledge and expertise to produce similar drugs pre-acquisition.45 For 
small molecule overlapping acquisitions, acquirers already have a similar 
                                                             
42 See Luke Gelinas et al., When Clinical Trials Compete: Prioritising Study Recruitment, 43 J. 
MED. ETHICS 803, 804-05 (2017). 
43 See Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 10-11 (explaining the product market choices of an 
acquirer in the authors’ theoretical framework). 
44 For context, the global similarity mean of 0.133 determined by Cunningham and co-authors, 
id. at 43-44, indicates minimal derivative innovation, as lower similarity implies higher novelty. 
By contrast, Krieger et al. determined that almost all drug candidates entering Phase I clinical 
trials have maximum similarity scores greater than 0.2 relative to prior drug candidates, with 
most falling in the 0.3 to 0.6 range. See Joshua L. Krieger et al., Missing Novelty in Drug Devel-
opment 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24595, 2019). 
45 To the extent the target firm possessed patents covering a genus of compounds structurally 
similar to the acquired drug, acquisition may provide the acquirer more freedom to operate with 
respect to the acquired drug scaffold, or its own. However, the acquirer may also avoid develop-
ing drugs resembling publicly disclosed compounds due to patentability or patent term concerns. 
See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
503, 549-51 (2009).  
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drug in their portfolio, which may or may not be chemically similar to the 
acquired drug.46 Unless an acquirer believed that both drugs were inade-
quate but salvageable with minor structural modifications, or that modi-
fying the scaffold would result in different biological activity, the acquirer 
possesses few incentives to continue developing similar molecules. How-
ever, redeployment may be more plausible when biotechnology firms are 
acquired because production know-how and other trade secrets are more 
valuable in protein-based therapeutic development and manufacturing.47  
Nevertheless, the acquirer may gain valuable negative trade secrets 
related to scaffolds that do not work when acquiring a target firm devel-
oping drugs in the same therapeutic area, an essentially unobservable as-
set. The importance of negative know-how, which often relates to com-
pounds that never became drug candidates, on acquisition decisions is 
difficult to assess empirically. However, given the high value with associ-
ated rapid market entry, negative trade secrets might be worth millions to 
the acquirer.48 
To explore human capital redeployment, Cunningham and co-
authors further considered inventor mobility and productivity post-
acquisition.49 They determined that only 22% of pre-acquisition inventors 
moved to the acquirer post-acquisition and did not find evidence that re-
tained inventors became more productive.50 While their speculation is 
plausible that acquisition-as-hiring “might not be as common in pharma-
ceuticals as in other industries,” given the low number of revenue-
generating products per firm and the relatively long life-cycles of those 
products, their original hypothesis that “human capital underpinning 
overlapping projects would be useful for the acquiring firm” is suspect.51 
Specifically, the underlying human capital they consider is the synthetic 
chemists who develop overlapping drugs, not the clinicians or clinical trial 
                                                             
46 See Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 3 (noting that projects were considered to be over-
lapping if they were in the same therapeutic class and relied on the same mechanism of action). 
47 See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition 
and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1032-36 (2016) (describing unique challenges associated 
with manufacturing biologics). In contrast to small molecule drugs like aspirin, biologics are 
large and structurally complex drugs produced by living cells. See id. at 1026. 
48 To date, priority review vouchers, which entitle the holder to priority review from the FDA, 
have sold for $68 to $350 million, with six vouchers sold in 2017 for known sale prices between 
$110 and $130 million. See David Ridley, PriorityReviewVouchers.com, 
http://priorityreviewvoucher.org (2018). For drugs evaluated under priority review, the FDA 
aims to provide a decision in six months, rather than the ten-month goal for standard review. 
Priority Review, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/fast-
track-breakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approval-priority-review/priority-review. 
49 See Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 44-45. However, acquisition-as-hiring might be harder 
to rule out as an alternative explanation for overlapping acquisitions in other industries, includ-
ing the tech industry.  
50 See id. at 45. 
51 See id. at 44. 
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managers involved in further commercialization efforts. Because synthet-
ic chemists specialize in early-stage development, a stage that all studied 
projects had cleared, it is not obvious that this human capital is being 
“redeployed.” Moreover, synthetic chemists with expertise related to the 
overlapping drug would possess higher-than-average utility only if the ac-
quiring firm wanted to develop yet another developmental candidate for 
the same indication with the same mechanism of action. Given the poten-
tial market cannibalization inherent in further development efforts, any 
human capital motivation likely hinges on later-stage employees, who are 
harder to track than inventors and represent another source of empirical 
uncertainty. 
III. Antitrust Implications of Pharmaceutical Killer Acquisitions 
Most acquisitions, including intellectual property acquisitions, do not 
violate federal antitrust laws.52 However, some acquisitions with anti-
competitive effects violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act,53 as well as Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.54 While Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
which is directly concerned with mergers, appears to be the most direct 
tool for discouraging anti-competitive acquisitions, Section 7 is largely en-
forced through pre-acquisition review by the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) rather than case law.55 Section III.A below discusses how killer ac-
quisitions fit within the existing Clayton Act framework. Section III.B 
considers killer acquisitions as a form of monopoly maintenance subject 
to condemnation under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  
                                                             
52 See Mergers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers (noting that 95% of merger filings considered by the FTC 
and Department of Justice annually present no competitive issues). While pharmaceutical acqui-
sitions often include the transfer of property and technical know-how in addition to patent 
rights, the most valuable part of the sale is generally the patents covering the clinical candidate. 
As Cunningham et al. note, “[t]he pharmaceutical industry is almost exclusively project-driven 
with strong project-specific intellectual property rights protection, in contrast to many other in-
dustries in which startups are valued more for their human capital.” See Cunningham et al., su-
pra note 14, at 44. 
53 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2018); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2018) (original version at ch. 323, §7, 38 Stat. 
730, 731-32 (1914)). The Clayton Act supplements the Sherman Act and attempts to curb anti-
competitive conduct, such as price discrimination and mergers and acquisitions that reduce com-
petition, before such conduct affects competition on the merits. 
54 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (original version at 26 Stat. 209 (1890)). The Sherman Act broadly condemns 
anticompetitive horizontal agreements between competitors, as well as unilateral conduct that 
monopolizes or attempts to monopolize a market. 
55 See CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 34-35 (2011) (“Relatively little case law exists on mergers—and no Su-
preme Court cases have been decided in the last thirty years—because when the government 
challengers a merger, the parties often abandon the deal.”). 
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A. Killer Acquisitions Below the Antitrust Review Threshold 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act condemns mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) that substantially restrict competition or promote monopoliza-
tion.56 In addition, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires merging parties 
above a certain size to provide advanced notice to the Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice and the FTC before merging.57 Pre-merger 
notice enables antitrust agencies to challenge mergers, often resulting in 
abandonment or voluntary modification of the merger by the parties.58 
Enforcement priorities thus play an outsized role in M&A, enabling the 
FTC and Antitrust Division to mitigate some harmful conduct without 
changing the law as written or interpreted by the federal courts. 
However, sub-$200 million acquisitions are typically not reviewed by 
the FTC,59 so low budget anti-competitive acquisitions generally escape 
antitrust scrutiny unless the FTC intervenes post-acquisition. But even if 
the FTC steps in, anti-competitive harm often goes unrepaired, with 
courts notoriously hesitant to unwind consummated mergers.60 While pri-
vate plaintiffs satisfying standing requirements can challenge mergers and 
acquisitions, few well-resourced private parties are incentivized to oppose 
killer acquisitions, which leave the target firm, the acquirer, and all other 
incumbents better off. Because any well-capitalized private party that 
wanted to enter the field (i.e., a non-incumbent) would presumably out-
bid the overlapping acquirer given the limited range of rational acquire-
to-kill prices, potential entrants are also unlikely to challenge acquisitions 
in court. As a result, private enforcement mechanisms may be ill-
equipped to save or resuscitate overlapping projects.  
One response to killer acquisitions then would be to lower the 
threshold for pre-acquisition review of overlapping acquisitions, allowing 
                                                             
56 Clayton Act § 7. 
57 See LESLIE, supra note 55, at 34. 
58 See id. at 35. 
59 See Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 40 & n.40, 41. 
60 See David Edmon, The Utah Statement: A Bulwark Against Private Power, AM. PROSPECT 
(Dec. 19, 2019), https://prospect.org/economy/the-utah-statement-bulwark-against-private-
power-antitrust/ (“[B]oth judges and the federal government are very reluctant to unwind a 
merger even if evidence emerges that the settlement failed to protect competition.”); see also 
Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 383 (2011) (“It is pos-
sible (although difficult) to force parties to unwind an anticompetitive merger if they begin to 
exercise anticompetitive power because of the merger.”); John Stigi & Alejandro Moreno, Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal Refuses to Permit an Action for Rescission of a Strategic Transaction, 
Holding That a Board Has No Duty Under California Law to Include a “Fiduciary Out,” 
SHEPPARDMULLIN (Aug. 22, 2011), https://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2011/08/ 
california-court-of-appeal-refuses-to-permit-an-action-for-rescission-of-a-strategic-transaction-
holding-that-a-board-has-no-duty-under-california-law-to-include-a-fiduciary-out/ (“This deci-
sion by the California Court of Appeal confirms that courts are reluctant to ‘unscramble the 
eggs’ after a strategic transaction closes, especially where the consequences of returning the tar-
get company to the status quo ante threatens the very survival of the target company.”). 
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the federal government, as the most likely antitrust enforcer, to step in 
earlier to police abusive conduct.61 Cunningham, Ederer, and Ma discov-
ered that many acquisition prices for overlapping drugs clustered directly 
below the threshold for antitrust review, in contrast with non-overlapping 
projects, which were less clustered.62 Moreover, the authors determined 
that eventual product launch rates were lower, and discontinuation rates 
higher, for just below-threshold acquisitions.63  
But below-threshold acquisition prices may simply reflect expecta-
tions regarding product success and acquirer-target gaming to increase 
the odds of a successful acquisition, limiting the utility of a lower review 
threshold as a method of policing killer acquisitions. After all, an acquirer 
must pay a target firm an acquisition price equal to or greater than the 
expected project payoff if the target firm continued development of its 
product.64 For valuations around the threshold, overlapping acquirers and 
targets may be more wary of antitrust review, even in legitimate acquisi-
tions, than nonoverlapping acquirers, due to the higher potential for de-
lay and deal rejection. To facilitate these deals, targets may be willing to 
take a slight pay cut to avoid review, causing clustering. This gaming is 
consistent with the acquisition size distributions reported by Cunning-
ham, Ederer, and Ma, with no overlapping deals valued directly above 
the threshold.65 Additionally, the acquirer must outbid other potential 
buyers. In a low-competition market where duopolist profits are available 
to a successful new entrant, other large firms without overlapping pro-
jects should place a high relative value on the overlapping project.  
Nevertheless, suspected killer acquisitions in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry appear to concentrate in low competition markets, where the po-
tential profits for competitors should be highest. While Cunningham and 
co-authors concluded that decreased development rates correlate with 
greater profit shielding, it would be anomalous if acquirers were consist-
ently able to buy valuable market protection on-the-cheap. Accordingly, 
the higher likelihood of success for overlapping drugs above the review 
threshold may reflect qualitative differences in bargaining conditions—
likely in the form of a competing, less threshold-sensitive non-
overlapping buyer or a highly confident target unwilling to accept a lower 
                                                             
61 While Cunningham and co-authors provide one standard for assessing overlapping acquisitions 
in the pharmaceutical industry, heightened review of overlapping acquisitions outside the phar-
maceutical industry may be confounded by definitional issues. One (imperfect) option for ex-
panding beyond the pharmaceutical industry might be reliance on patent classification networks. 
Cf. Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña & Ryan Whalen, A Network Theory of Patentability, 87 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 63 (2020) (assembling a network representation of different areas of technical knowledge 
based on U.S. patent records).  
62 See Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 40-41, 64 fig.6. 
63 See id. at 41, 73 tbl.9. 
64 See id. at 9-11.  
65 See id. at 64 fig.6. 
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price to increase convenience.66 In that case, overlapping acquirers only 
purchase and bury low-promise projects that could not entice non-
overlapping potential entrants to outbid the antitrust review threshold. 
Clustering, then, may reflect anti-competitive killer acquisitions, but only 
for drugs with a low likelihood of advancing anyway. Although such con-
duct lacks virtue, any social welfare gains from lowering the antitrust re-
view threshold for overlapping acquisitions (e.g., signaling value) may be 
swamped by enforcement and overdeterrence costs for legitimate acquisi-
tions. 
 B. Killer Acquisitions as Monopoly Maintenance 
Killer acquisitions do not fit cleanly in an existing antitrust box. Un-
like traditional acquisitions analyzed under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
killer acquisitions affect innovation markets rather than product or ser-
vice markets, implicating dynamic efficiencies not always considered in 
normal merger analysis.67 Moreover, in contrast to collusive patent acqui-
sitions, which occur in some technology markets, there is no conspiracy at 
the heart of most killer acquisitions. Instead, the acquirer in a killer ac-
quisition pays a target firm for its intellectual property in order to black 
out an innovation area—an outcome mutually beneficial to both parties 
and not, standing alone, an illegal result.68  
To date, the FTC has largely challenged potential killer acquisitions 
with significant overlap in product markets, condemning them under tra-
ditional acquisition frameworks.69 For example, in the 1990s, the FTC 
challenged the merger of Baxter and Immuno, two firms with fibrin seal-
ants in late-stage clinical trials and no quickly-moving competitors, re-
quiring Baxter to license its prospective product as part of a consent de-
cree.70 Similarly, the FTC challenged the proposed combination of Pfizer 
and Warner-Lambert’s respective EGFR-TK inhibitor R&D programs as 
                                                             
66 The authors do not report on continuation rates for non-overlapping drugs just above and be-
low the review threshold, so it is not clear if the increased success for above-threshold projects is 
specific to overlapping drugs. See Cunningham et al., supra note 15, passim. 
67 See Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement if Innovation Mattered 
Most, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 316-20 (2012); see also Ronald W. Davis, Innovation Markets and 
Merger Enforcement: Current Practice in Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 677, 679-82 (2003) 
(describing differences between innovation markets and the more traditional product, services, 
and technology markets usually considered by antitrust authorities). 
68 See United States v. Singer Mfg., Co., 374 U.S. 174, 189 (1963) (“There is no claim by the 
Government that it is illegal for one merely to acquire a patent in order to exclude his competi-
tors; or that the owner of a lawfully acquired patent cannot use the patent laws to exclude all 
infringers of the patent . . . .”). 
69 See Davis, supra note 64, at 690-93 (describing twelve FTC enforcement actions related to 
pharmaceutical innovation markets based on more traditional antitrust theories such as potential 
competition).  
70 See Baxter Int'l, Inc., 123 F.T.C. 904 (1997); Davis, supra note 64, at 692. 
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part of a larger merger between Pfizer and Warner-Lambert; at the time, 
the two firms were believed to be the most advanced in the FDA approv-
al process for EGFR-TK inhibitors for the treatment of solid tumors.71 As 
part of its consent order, the FTC required Pfizer to divest its R&D in-
terests to a development partner.72  
Among established antitrust violations, killer acquisitions without 
substantial product market effects most closely resemble another anti-
competitive crutch the pharmaceutical industry has been known to lean 
on: reverse settlements.73 In a reverse settlement, also referred to as a 
“pay-for-delay” agreement, the plaintiff in a patent litigation suit agrees 
to pay the defendant to cease infringement for a specified time period 
and to drop its patent validity challenges.74 For pharmaceutical patentees, 
reverse settlements discourage generic entry because regulatory law allo-
cates a valuable incentive—180 days of market exclusivity—only to the 
first generic applicant to file an abbreviated new drug application with a 
Paragraph IV certification challenging the validity of patents covering a 
brand name drug.75 Most generic drug profits accrue during this exclusivi-
ty period; after it concludes, other generics can enter the market and low-
er prices closer to the marginal cost of production.76 If the first generic 
applicant forfeits that exclusivity by settling with the brand name firm, 
other generic applicants can continue to litigate but risk low or no profits 
due to free-riding if they prevail.77    
Like reverse settlements, killer acquisitions in the pharmaceutical 
industry rely on patent protection and high regulatory entry barriers to 
forestall competition. In addition, killer acquisitions depend on profit 
asymmetry between the parties to the transaction, where the expected 
profit loss to one firm exceeds the new entrant’s expected profits. Moreo-
ver, both killer acquisitions and reverse settlements rely on a legal enti-
tlement controlled by the new entrant. While the legal entitlement under-
lying reverse settlements is a 180-day market exclusivity period for the 
first Paragraph IV filers under the Hatch-Waxman Act,78 killer acquisi-
tions are made possible by patent exclusivity and regulatory require-
ments. Specifically, no other firm can directly rely on the clinical trial da-
ta generated by the target firm to reduce development costs or accelerate 
approval for a design-around drug; the differences in chemical structure 
                                                             
71 Pfizer Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-3957 (2000); Davis, supra note 64, at 692. 
72 Pfizer Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-3957 (2000); Davis, supra note 64, at 692. 
73 See generally C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U L. REV. 1553 (2006). 
74 See FTC v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136, 140-41 (2013) (defining reverse settlements). 
75 See Hemphill, supra note 70, at 1560. 
76 See id. at 1560; see also Actavis, 570 U.S. at 144. 
77 See Hemphill, supra note 70, at 1560-61. 
78 See id. 
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necessary to side-step patents force the potential entrant to conduct clini-
cal trials from the ground up. The blocking patent’s power is thus ampli-
fied by FDA regulations.  
Nevertheless, for reasons similar to those outlined by the Supreme 
Court in the most authoritative decision on reverse settlements to date, 
FTC v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136 (2013),79 per se illegality is overkill for over-
lapping pharmaceutical acquisitions. Instead, courts and antitrust agen-
cies should engage in rule-of-reason analysis to balance the potential pro-
competitive and anti-competitive effects of overlapping acquisitions with 
killer potential, as discussed in Section III.B.ii below. Moreover, Section 
III.B.ii argues that courts should take more than a “quick look”80 before 
condemning overlapping acquisitions due to the ambiguous welfare ef-
fects of even intentional killer acquisitions. 
 i. Consumer Harm and Killer Acquisitions 
While the motivations underlying killer acquisitions are not new, 
courts have limited experience evaluating their anti-competitive poten-
tial, cautioning against adoption of a per se rule, or even abbreviated 
rule-of-reason (quick look) review. In Actavis, the Supreme Court reiter-
ated that “abandonment of ‘the rule of reason’ in favor of presumptive 
rules (or a ‘quick look’ approach) is appropriate only where ‘an observer 
with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that 
the arrangements in question have an anti-competitive effect on custom-
ers and markets.’”81 The Court held that reverse settlements in which a 
pharmaceutical company pays a generic manufacturer as part of a patent 
infringement case did not clear this high bar because “the likelihood of a 
reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive effects depends upon its 
size, its scale in relation to the payor's anticipated future litigation costs, 
its independence from other services for which it might represent pay-
ment, and the lack of any other convincing justification.”82 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court chose not to adopt an industry-specific antitrust ap-
proach even for the relatively unique pharmaceutical industry, stating 
that “[t]he existence and degree of any anticompetitive consequence may 
also vary as among industries” so “the FTC must prove its case as in oth-
er rule-of-reason cases.”83 The Court reached this conclusion despite not-
                                                             
79 See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158-60. 
80 See id. at 158-60 (briefly summarizing the “quick look” approach to antitrust review, which 
shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate procompetitive effects, and appropriate appli-
cations of this approach). 
81 See id. at 159 (quoting California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)). 
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 159. However, as some scholars have noted, antitrust law in practice is often industry-
specific. See Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011 COLUM. 
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ing that “most if not all reverse payment settlement agreements arise in 
the context of pharmaceutical drug regulation.”84 
As discussed in Part II, overlapping acquisitions often involve color-
able pro-competitive justifications, and most are not purely motivated by 
killer intent. Moreover, per se condemnation appears to be particularly 
inappropriate when the acquirer’s overlapping project is also under de-
velopment. Drug discovery, after all, is a risky business, and an internal 
project will not produce any revenue until the FDA approves it. Entry in-
to clinical trials is no guarantee of success, even for drugs that companies 
want to launch.85  
Cunningham and co-authors estimated that about thirteen additional 
drug projects per year would continue development if acquisitions of 
overlapping projects were banned and all overlapping projects had the 
same development likelihood as non-acquired projects.86 In view of the 
low success rate for clinical candidates entering Phase I clinical trials, on-
ly a handful of the thirteen additional drug projects—as few as zero or 
one—would mature into marketed drugs capable of constraining the in-
cumbent’s use (or abuse) of market power. In fact, given the low pur-
chase prices for many prospective acquisitions, which presumably reflect 
market valuations of overlapping drugs, most killer acquisitions in the 
pharmaceutical industry likely impose no direct harm on consumers.87  
Moreover, not all FDA-approved drugs are created equal from a so-
cial welfare perspective, and many overlapping projects would exhibit 
similar therapeutic efficacy to approved treatments. In fact, many over-
lapping drugs would likely qualify as “me-too drugs,” a controversial sub-
set of pharmaceutical innovation. While me-too drugs can be more effec-
tive than similar treatments in a subset of patients,88 me-too drugs rarely 
                                                                                                                                             
BUS. L. REV. 637, 648-51 (2011) (“This industry specificity results from the nature of antitrust, 
which—far more than patent law—is concerned with the particular economic characteristics of 
both the practice being regulated and the market in which the practice occurs.”). 
84 See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 141. 
85 Mark Kessel & Frederick S. Frank, A Better Prescription for Drug-Development Financing, 
25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 859, 860 (2007). 
86 See Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 49. 
87 As Cunningham et al. note, the effects of killer acquisitions on ex ante innovation incentives 
are difficult to tease out. See Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 50-51. However, killer acquisi-
tions—like all acquisitions—likely increase the odds of a profitable exit for smaller target firms. 
Moreover, if killer acquisitions provide earlier-than-average (Phase I) liquidation events, they 
may make it easier for smaller firms to access venture capital, which is notoriously focused on 
quick returns. See P. Lehoux et al., How Does Venture Capital Operate in Medical Innovation?, 
2 BMJ INNOVATIONS 111, 112-14 (2016). 
88 Cf. Albert I. Wertheimer, Thomas M. Santella & Nichole M. Chaney, The World Health Or-
ganization’s Essential Medicines List: An Endorsement of Incremental Innovation and Follow-
On Research, 17 J. PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING & MGMT. 25, 29–30 (2011) (estimating that 
81% of the medicines deemed essential by the WHO in 2003 were me-too products). 
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impose substantial price constraints,89 although they can create more bar-
gaining leverage for healthcare payors.90 Nevertheless, critics contend that 
“the billions of dollars spent marketing me-too products could be spent in 
better ways, such as developing orphan drugs for rare diseases [because] 
these products add little to physicians’ arsenal, while driving up the costs 
of health care.”91 Me-too drugs, in other words, may be an expensive and 
ineffective method of controlling drug prices, albeit one that requires lit-
tle intervention on the part of the federal government. 
Allocative criticisms of me-too drugs are only justified if pharmaceu-
tical companies are not funding all projects with expected positive re-
turns, an assumption that is empirically disputed. Under one view of 
R&D expenditures, pharmaceutical companies direct their limited budg-
ets to clinical candidates that promise the highest risk-adjusted reward at 
the lowest cost.92 If this view reflects reality, some potentially profitable 
drugs are not being developed. In that case, resources that would have 
been devoted to an overlapping drug could be reallocated to other poten-
tially consumer-welfare enhancing drugs following project termination. 
However, some scholars believe that pharmaceutical companies already 
pursue all profitable projects.93 Under this view, the loss of one develop-
mental candidate due to a killer acquisition will not be compensated by 
new drug funding because all alternative profitable projects are adequate-
ly funded.94  
The empirical evidence is inconclusive. In the context of the Orphan 
Drug Act, which provides a package of regulatory and tax incentives to 
encourage the development of drugs for conditions affecting small patient 
populations, R&D spending as measured through tax returns remained 
relatively flat over a period of years while orphan drug credit claims dra-
matically increased.95 Tax records suggest that firms reallocated R&D 
                                                             
89 See Thomas H. Lee, “Me-Too” Products—Friend or Foe?, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 211, 211-12 
(2004). 
90 Illustratively, competition between Gilead and AbbVie in the hepatitis C market resulted in 
more discounts and rebates for healthcare payors. See John LaMattina, Impact of ‘Me-Too’ 
Drugs on Health Care Costs, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2015, 8:33 AM EST), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/johnlamattina/2015/01/19/impact-of-me-too-drugs-on-health-care-costs/#44615ffd1c36.  
91 Lee, supra note 90, at 211. These critics typically criticize me-too innovation as incremental at 
best and expensive in any case. 
92 See Sean Nicholson, Financing Research and Development, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
THE ECONOMICS OF THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 47, 61 (Patricia M. Danzon & Sean 
Nicholson eds., 2012). 
93 See Roin, supra note 45, at 551. 
94 See id. (“The R&D side of the pharmaceutical industry is highly competitive, and firms should 
be expected to pursue all drug candidates with anticipated net positive returns, not just the drugs 
with the highest anticipated net returns.”) (citations omitted). 
95 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-40, DRUG INDUSTRY: PROFITS, 




funding in response to the new incentives, rather than increasing total 
R&D spending due to an expansion in the number of potentially profita-
ble projects.96 However, a study by Blume-Kohout and Sood found that 
the introduction of Medicare Part D increased R&D spending on drugs 
with large market shares for patients over 65, without reducing the 
amount invested in other drugs.97 
Accordingly, the much-discussed assertion that “patient mortality, 
consumer surplus, and technological spillovers are all likely negatively af-
fected by killer acquisitions” may be too strong.98 Based on Cunningham, 
Ederer, and Ma’s estimates, killer acquisitions bury one or two (likely 
me-too) drugs that would otherwise enter the market each year. Given 
how ineffective me-too drugs generally are at constraining drug costs, pa-
tients may not be paying much more for their reduced options. Addition-
ally, patient mortality, consumer surplus, and technological spillovers 
could be positively affected by these burials if the funds that otherwise 
would have been spent developing and marketing a me-too drug are in-
stead directed to indications with greater unmet need. Although target 
firms could also redirect funding if they had enough non-committed capi-
tal and expertise, making the acquisition wasteful, established incumbents 
may be better positioned to change direction than originators with small 
pipelines and smaller war chests.99  
Between the extremes of rule-of-reason analysis and per se illegality, 
other options exist for evaluating overlapping acquisitions. However, giv-
en the challenges associated with identifying killer intent at the time of 
acquisition, these options would likely increase the costs of all overlap-
ping acquisitions without substantially reducing the number of killer ac-
quisitions. For example, in 2018, the European Commission’s chief com-
petition economist suggested that shifting the burden of proof onto 
acquirers to prove the efficiencies of their acquisitions could deter killer 
acquisitions.100 But for pharmaceutical acquisitions—particularly acquisi-
tions where overlap occurs purely in innovation markets with no market-
                                                             
96 See id. 
97 See Margaret E. Blume-Kohout & Neeraj Sood, Market Size and Innovation: Effects of Medi-
care Part D on Pharmaceutical Research and Development, 97 J. PUB. ECON. 327, 328, 334-35 
(2013). 
98 See Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 50. 
99 Most firms originating new drugs originated two or fewer drugs between 1989 and 2010, sug-
gesting that many target firms have small pipelines and potentially few redirect options. See 
Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 64 fig.5. Moreover, “when a risk appears, biotechnology 
firm stock valuations (reflecting their underlying intangible assets’ values) suffer even more than 
pharmaceutical stock prices,” suggesting that certain firm types may be better positioned than 
others to pivot in response to changing circumstances. See Golec & Vernon, supra note 21, at 17. 
100 See Janith Aranze, DG Comp Chief Economist: Reverse Burden of Proof to Catch Killer Ac-
quisitions, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1177095/dg-comp-chief-economist-reverse-burden-
of-proof-to-catch-killer-acquisitions. 
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ed products—even firms intentionally acquiring to kill may be able to 
present enough evidence of colorable efficiencies to evade condemnation, 
while raising compliance costs for all. These compliance costs may be 
passed onto consumers, imposing a separate harm to consumer welfare.101 
Worse, heightened enforcement costs may slow time to market for legit-
imate acquisitions or prevent some acquisitions altogether, reducing 
treatment options and potentially affecting patient quality of life. Illustra-
tively, the merger between Pharmacia and Upjohn, two pharmaceutical 
companies with largely complementary products and geographic reach, 
was delayed by the FTC due to concerns about the post-merger develop-
ment of 9-AC, an overlapping drug candidate for treating solid tumors.102 
While the merger went forward on the condition that the combined com-
pany divest 9-AC U.S. assets,103 9-AC ultimately showed insufficient effi-
cacy in Phase II clinical trials to justify its continued development.104 
Similarly, declaring lump sum acquisitions by overlapping firms per 
se illegal while allowing upfront payments with future milestone pay-
ments might discourage killer acquisitions through reputation effects; be-
cause the possibility of a bad faith milestone miss could cause overlapping 
targets to apply a higher discount rate to milestone payments, overlap-
ping firms suspected of killer acquisitions should be forced to pay more 
for every overlapping drug. However, given the low incidence of killer 
acquisitions and the small chance of any pipeline drug obtaining FDA 
approval, requiring different acquisition structures may interfere with le-
gitimate acquisitions and dampen ex ante innovation incentives by reduc-
ing buyer-side demand in innovation markets. Therefore, barring better 
methods of identifying acquisitions with killer characteristics, increased 
enforcement costs and the heightened risk of false negatives (i.e., legiti-
mate overlapping acquisitions not occurring due to errors and increased 
costs) caution against adopting an intermediate option. 
 ii. Killer Acquisitions Under the Rule of Reason 
Although it may be difficult to prove a killer acquisition or establish 
anti-competitive effects, killer acquisitions could still face censure under 
                                                             
101 See Dustin Chambers, Courtney Collins & Alan Krause, How Do Federal Regulations Affect 
Consumer Prices? An Analysis of the Regressive Effects of Regulation, 180 PUB. CHOICE 57, 59 
(2019) (finding that “growth in federal regulations is associated with higher consumer prices 
overall”). 
102 See Eleanor J. Morgan, Innovation and Merger Decisions in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 
REV. IND. ORG. 181, 186-87 (2001) (summarizing the responses of American and European anti-
trust authorities to the planned merger). 
103 See id. 
104 See generally Chris H. Takimoto & Rebecca Thomas, The Clinical Development of 9-
Aminocamptothecin, 922 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 224 (2000) (discussing the history of 9-AC, 
including its ultimate termination by new rights holder IDEC Pharmaceutical Corporation). 
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traditional rule-of-reason review. Illustratively, the FTC challenged 
Questcor’s (now a subsidiary of Mallinckrodt) acquisition of U.S. devel-
opment rights to Synacthen Depot, a synthetic competitor to its adreno-
corticotropic hormone drug Acthar, in 2013 for a below-threshold acqui-
sition price.105 At the time, Acthar was the only FDA-approved 
adrenocorticotropic hormone drug in the United States106 but lacked pa-
tent protection,107 satisfying only one of the primary two criterion (i.e., 
low market competition and overlapping product far from patent protec-
tion) that Cunningham and co-authors identified for killer acquisitions.108 
At the time of acquisition, Synacthen Depot was approved for use in Eu-
rope and Canada, but not the United States.109 However, Questcor “con-
sider[ed] the drugs so similar that it submitted Synacthen information to 
support its application to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
to expand the label indications for Acthar and cited Synacthen studies in 
its Acthar marketing materials,”110 evincing a high likelihood that Synac-
then could obtain FDA approval for Acthar’s indications if someone per-
formed the necessary clinical trials. 
As the FTC noted in its Complaint, “Questcor claimed that it ac-
quired Synacthen to develop it for new, non-Acthar indications, but given 
the drugs’ similarities, any therapeutic indication that Questcor pursues 
with Synacthen could have been pursued with Acthar.”111 Moreover, 
when Questcor sought exclusive rights to develop, market, and sell Syn-
acthen, it did not include detailed development plans in its offer or con-
duct extensive due diligence before submitting an offer to Novartis,112 
cutting against acquiring to continue given its experience and information 
advantages with respect to adrenocorticotropic hormone drugs. 
The FTC’s Complaint was never litigated, but Retrophin, one of the 
firms Questcor outbid for Synacthen, filed an antitrust suit alleging the 
acquisition violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of 
                                                             
105 See Cunningham, supra note 14, at 1. 
106 See Complaint at 8-9, FTC v. Mallinckrodt ARD Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00120 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 
2017). 
107 See Mallinckrodt, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1567892/000156789214000040/mnk10-k92614.htm. (“Acthar is not subject to 
patent or other exclusivity, with the exception of IS which was granted orphan drug status from 
the FDA upon its approval in October 2010. Acthar's commercial durability therefore relies par-
tially upon product formulation trade secrets, confidentiality agreements and trademark and 
copyright laws.”). 
108 Formulation challenges posed a formidable entry barrier for potential generic competitors. 
See id. 
109 See Complaint, supra note 107, at 6, 8. 
110 See id. at 3. 
111 Id. at 12. 
112 Id. at 10-11.  
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the Clayton Act.113 In rejecting Questcor’s Motion to Dismiss, the district 
court examined the pled facts under traditional monopolization frame-
works and determined that “there [was] no alleged procompetitive aspect 
to the challenged conduct” and “the necessity of FDA approval under 
[the] circumstances [did] not render the alleged harm too speculative.”114 
Questcor later settled with both the FTC and Retrophin.115 The FTC also 
ordered Questcor to “grant a license to develop Synacthen Depot to treat 
infantile spasms and nephrotic syndrome to a licensee approved by the 
Commission,”116 which Questcor did in 2017.117  
While traditional antitrust litigation ultimately identified and un-
wound Questcor’s killer acquisition, the firm probably profited from the 
transaction, with $1.037 billion in net sales of Acthar in 2015 alone118 
compared to net settlement costs in the low $100 million range. Clinical 
trials for Synacthen were also delayed by several years, postponing com-
petition and market pressure on Acthar pricing. But Synacthen’s facts are 
exceptional—with sky-high prices on a hard-to-manufacture specialty 
drug, an overlapping drug long-approved in Europe, and a lost bidding 
war with a litigious competitor. Bad facts make bad law, and attempting 
broader pre-acquisition review for overlapping acquisitions to catch the 
next Synacthen would strain the FTC’s limited resources without high 
odds of uncovering many (or any) transactions as blatantly anti-
competitive as Questcor’s.119  
                                                             
113 See Retrophin, Inc. v. Questcor Pharm., Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 906, 912 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Synac-
then presents the unusual case of an outbid competitor filing a private antitrust action, which 
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2001, a large and profitable market for a successful new entrant, and the personality of then-
Retrophin CEO Martin Shkreli. 
114 See id. at 913, 915. The district court also noted that Questcor had not met its burden of as-
serting a business justification for the acquisition. See id. at 918. 
115 See Dan Mangan, Mallinckrodt to Pay $100 million to Settle FTC, State Charges on Antitrust 
Violations Linked to Martin Shkreli-Backed Lawsuit, CNBC (Jan. 18, 2017, 6:24 PM EST), 
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116 See Mallinckrodt Will Pay $100 Million to Settle FTC, State Charges It Illegally Maintained 
Its Monopoly of Specialty Drug Used to Treat Infants, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/mallinckrodt-will-pay-100-million-settle-
ftc-state-charges-it. 
117 See FTC Approves Sublicense for Synacthen Depot Submitted by Mallinckrodt ARD Inc., 
FED. TRADE COMM'N (July 14, 2017) (https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2017/07/ftc-approves-sublicense-synacthen-depot-submitted-mallinckrodt). 
118 See Mallinckrodt PLC Reports Financial Results for Fiscal 2015 Fourth Quarter and Full 
Year, CISION: PR NEWSWIRE (Nov. 23, 2015) (https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/mallinckrodt-plc-reports-financial-results-for-fiscal-2015-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-
300183027.html). 
119 Questcor’s acquisition evaded review in part because the licensor Novartis retained some 
manufacturing rights. See Andrew Pollack, Questcor Pays $135 Million to Acquire Rights to a 
Competitor’s Drug, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/15/business/questcor-pays-135-million-for-rights-to-
competitors-drug.html. In November 2013, the FTC expanded the scope of pharmaceutical li-
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IV. Killer Acquisitions Across Industries 
While Cunningham, Ederer, and Ma’s working paper focuses on the 
pharmaceutical industry, fear of market cannibalization is not industry-
specific. However, killer acquisitions may be more common in the phar-
maceutical industry because the regulatory environment makes it effec-
tively impossible to enter the market until an innovative firm’s patents 
covering a drug have expired. In addition, me-too drugs, which function 
as patent design-arounds in some cases, are very expensive to develop 
relative to design-arounds in other industries because the bulk of the 
R&D costs are related to regulatory approval, not early-stage product 
development. As a result, incumbents weighing a killer acquisition can be 
more confident than firms in other industries that the deal will not be the 
first of many in a game of a whack-a-mole. 
Furthermore, the profit protection effect may be smaller in faster-
moving, service-oriented industries, reducing the number of rational kill-
er acquisitions. For example, in the rapidly evolving tech industry, prod-
uct life-cycles tend to be shorter, and patents provide less effective pro-
tection against competition. Therefore, the profit at risk due to an 
overlapping technology is likely lower, and the protection against compe-
tition less certain and permanent. Additionally, a tech company may be 
better positioned to integrate at least some aspects of an overlapping 
technology into its next product iteration, which will not be subjected to 
protracted pre-launch regulatory review. Tech companies are also more 
likely to engage in acquisitions to gain access to human capital that they 
can redeploy to other projects, a phenomenon common enough to earn a 
nickname: acqui-hiring.120 Therefore, while many acquisitions in the tech 
space may be motivated by anti-competitive aims, it is not clear how 
many tech acquirers intend to bury innovations, rather than innovative 
competitors. Acquisitions intended to kill competitors, rather than com-
peting innovations, directly implicate market structure concerns and fit 
                                                                                                                                             
censing transactions subject to pre-merger review to include those in which licensors retain lim-
ited manufacturing rights or co-rights, which might drive down acquisition prices. See FTC Final-
izes Amendments to the Premerger Notification Rules Related to the Transfer of Exclusive Pa-
tent Rights in the Pharmaceutical Industry, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Nov. 6, 2013) 
(https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/11/ftc-finalizes-amendments-premerger-
notification-rules-related). Granting the FTC more power to halt announced but unconsummat-
ed mergers below the review threshold could ameliorate some of the harm associated with defi-
nitional oversights in the future as Questcor reached the FTC’s radar before the “scrambled 
eggs” stage of M&A. 
120 See Jackson Burke, Have Job, Will Buy Your Firm: Tech’s ‘Acqui-Hire’ Trend, CNBC 
(Nov. 9, 2014, 12:00 PM EST), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/07/have-job-will-buy-your-firm-
techs-acqui-hire-trend.html (“In recent months, some investors and observers have taken aim at 
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that sees employees jump ship to other companies–or even become future competitors.”). 
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more cleanly within the classical antitrust canon. Thus, more vigorous en-
forcement, rather than new frameworks, may be sufficient to mitigate 
long-term harm to consumers.121 
Nevertheless, technologies that share certain key features with 
pharmaceuticals—strong intellectual-property protection, long product 
life-cycles, and low cross-elasticity of demand—may be similarly vulnera-
ble to killer acquisitions. Illustratively, competing standards may promote 
killer acquisitions as companies jockey to position their technology for 
standard status. Once a technology is incorporated into a standard, a 
company’s patents covering the standard increase in value, and the value 
increase persists until the patents expire or the standard is abandoned. 
Moreover, because switching costs tend to be higher after a standard is 
adopted, cross-elasticity of demand between substitutes is reduced rela-
tive to a but-for world. Similarly, competing technology platforms may 
motivate killer acquisitions because network effects extend product life-
cycles and reduce cross-elasticity of demand. Thus, an acquiring firm can 
increase the value of its overlapping product by capturing consumers. Ar-
guably, Broadcom’s attempted acquisition of Qualcomm, which was 
blocked due to concerns about the merger’s potential effects on U.S.-
based development of 5G technologies, fell into this category.122  
V. Conclusion 
Intentionally killing competing innovations to protect existing prod-
uct markets runs counter to the goals of both federal intellectual property 
law and antitrust law. But many overlapping acquisitions are not killer 
acquisitions, and these acquisitions may promote dynamic efficiency, or 
at least cause no net harm to consumers. Accordingly, heightened anti-
trust scrutiny of overlapping transactions—in the form of per se condem-
nation, quick look review, or reduced administrative review thresholds—
would increase transaction costs without producing significant welfare 
gains for consumers relative to rule-of-reason review. Some anti-
competitive mischief may sneak through under the rule of reason, but 
current evidence does not suggest that many firms are committing mur-
der—at least where social welfare is concerned. 
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